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‘Mightier Than Marx’:
Hassoldt Davis and American Cold War Politics in Postwar Ivory Coast

by Abou B. Bamba
Gettysburg College

ABSTRACT
Using the travels of Hassoldt Davis in Ivory Coast to explore the global Cold War in French
West Africa in the 1950s, this article argues that the main line of confrontation in the postwar era
did not always pit Americans against Russians. In many instances, the struggle for the mind and
soul of Africans was between the Americans and the French. The study highlights the role of
everyday technology in the expansion of the American informal empire. By focusing on Davis
and the significance of low-tech artifacts, the article suggests that in our scrutiny of Cold War
science/technology, we need to supplement the study of the various production regimes of
consumer goods with a comparable research on consumption and how they mediated the daily
battles of the era. Such approach not only underscores the historical reality of the ‘social life of
things’, but also gives agency to non-state actors as both users of Cold War technoscience and as
participants in the politics that informed its mobilization on the world stage. Besides bringing
Francophone Africa in the historiography of US–Africa relations, the article demonstrates a
convergence of vision among American consular agents, US transnational corporations and an
idiosyncratic travel writer.
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‘Mightier Than Marx’:
Hassoldt Davis and American Cold War Politics in Postwar Ivory Coast

Assessing a couple of years ago the growing historical literature on American
involvement in the various imperial (dis)entanglements in the aftermath of the Second World
War, Martin Thomas concluded that there was little indication that ‘the eight French-speaking
colonies of sub-Saharan western Africa have generated much interest among historians of postwar American foreign policy.’ While he was reluctant to dispute the ‘lowly standing’ of West
Africa in the actual conduct of U.S. diplomacy during the postwar years, Thomas was adamant in
arguing that the United States was ‘no mere passive observer of events.’1 The British historian
could not be less on target in his assessment. The historiography of U.S. foreign relations with
Africa in the twentieth century has indeed largely focused on American dealings with
Anglophone (and sometimes, Lusophone) regions. If earlier works explored U.S. involvements
in various (geo)political imbroglios in Southern Africa, more recent studies have expanded this
political geography to include Washington’s relations with such countries as Ghana, Ethiopia,
Somalia, and Kenya. At the same, the issues of race, culture, and American investment in
processes of decolonization and development in Africa have received a new lease of life.2
Francophone West Africa has remained, however, understudied in the scholarship on
U.S.-Africa relations. With few exceptions, the analyses of historians continue to focus on other
regions of the continent. Yet much could be gained if Africa’s French-speaking countries were
brought into the frame of this historical literature.3 First, the inclusion has the potential to test the
validity of the general conclusions that historians have developed with regard to American
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presence in Africa. Moreover, it will help challenge a certain historiographical school that
narrates the story of Francophone Africa’s external relations in terms of exclusive FrancoAfrican rapports.
With these points in mind, the following article zeroes in on American presence in a
single territory in West Africa in the decade that followed the Second World War. It aims to
extend some of the insights of an emerging scholarship that is revising old certainties in an effort
to provide a sharper outline for the historiography of American foreign affairs in the region.
Expanding on the range of sources and actors usually analyzed in the histories of U.S.-Africa
relations, it partly focuses on the activities of American amateur ethnographer and travel writer
Hassoldt Davis who, together with his wife Ruth Staudinger Davis, toured Ivory Coast in the
early to mid-1950s and left written and cinematic chronicles of their peregrinations.4 While few
scholars have paid attention to this man, the article suggests that Davis’s ideas and attitudes—at
least, as revealed through his travelogue and unpublished papers—are a good refraction of the
views of many American transnational actors who had come to doubt the emancipatory power of
European civilizing missions.5 In fact, within the context of heightened postwar nationalism in
the colonies, an incipient global Cold War politics, and the expansion of what Henry Luce had
called the American Century, many observers in the United States thought that only American
leadership and activism could save the world.6
American diplomats were certainly working hard to realize this vision—a point I flesh
out in this paper. Even more, I argue that Davis’s activities in the early 1950s echo the postures
of U.S. officials and show that some Americans operated diligently in an attempt to displace
European colonial rule with what they posed as U.S.-style modernity and consumer culture. Such
a claim is surely in line with some of the arguments that historians John Kent and David Gibbs
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have suggested in their respective scrutiny of U.S. foreign policymaking in late colonial Africa.7
Unlike many of their characters, however, the self-appointed cold warrior Hassoldt Davis was at
the same time a Francophile, a critic of French colonialism, and a zealous apostle of the spread
of American-style modernity. The evidence that we have right now does not allow us to claim
that he was an agent of the American Cold War bureaucracy. But his actions were undoubtedly
in line with the Cold War mindset during this period. An intrepid roving, if unofficial, U.S.
ambassador, Davis also had come to believe, like some of his Ivorian informants, that
“Whiteman’s magic,” that is, Euro-American technology, was not only ‘mightier than Marx,’ but
also that its effective use promised victory over ubiquitous communist agitators in Ivory Coast
and probably beyond.8
That technoscientific artifacts were deployed to wage the global Cold War should not
come as a surprise. After all, many Cold War episodes entailed the mobilization of high science
and technology to advance the goals of the respective superpowers. A good deal of the Cold War
historiography has explored this theme as their authors appropriately redirect our scholarly
attention away from purely geopolitical considerations.9 In addition to contributing to this
reorientation, what is most intriguing about the Davis story and begs further critical
consideration is how it complicates the conventional lines of Cold War confrontations, shifting
the showdown from a U.S.-Soviet technological rivalry to a Franco-American clash over how to
best respond to the seeming infiltration of communist ideas among colonial subjects and
nationalists in French West Africa. Even more, Davis’s travelogue urges researchers to reorient
their attention from the regimes of production of ‘big’ technoscience. Only then can we critically
map out the routine and dynamic values at work in the mediation and consumption of small-scale
technoscientific commodities during the Cold War. For if historian David Arnold is right that
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mapping the everyday life of low-tech machines (cf. transistors, can openers, flashlights …) is
more meaningful for a deeper understanding of modernity, then Davis’s deployment of
American small-scale gadgets to fight communism becomes a vehicle to explore science as a
means to win the Cold War and thus spread American modernity and consumer culture.10
Ivory Coast, the physical setting where this unusual Cold War saga took place, was
hardly a blank space in America’s imperial or market geography of West Africa. Due to its
proximity to the American Colonization Society’s settlements of Liberia, New England trade
vessels had plied the western shores of the territory during the early decades of the nineteenth
century. By the middle of the century, trading relations between American merchants and the
local communities on the coast were regular enough to require the presence of a U.S. naval
squadron to ensure, in the words of a contemporary American officer, the ‘safety of commerce
and the general welfare of the world.’11 Although much of the area subsequently came under
French influence, the territory remained an attractive market for American products, especially
for rum and tobacco—two U.S. commodities that the West Africans apparently appreciated.12
While the consolidation of France’s colonial rule in 1893 reduced the American commercial
presence in Ivory Coast, French colonial neomercantilism (pacte colonial) did not stop U.S.Ivorian trade. At most, it altered the category of goods that were traded between the two regions.
By the middle of the twentieth century, not only did a third of Ivorian imports outside the Franc
zone come from the United States, but a high percentage of such imported goods consisted of
cars, trucks, machines, and other technoscientific gadgets—commodities that were ever more
dominating U.S. exports to the world as a whole.13
To be sure, the prime consumers of these products were the minority of white colonists in
the territory who, like their compatriots in metropolitan France, used the imported low-tech
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machines to enact their modernity, distance themselves from the local population, and thus
reaffirm the boundaries of colonial distinction.14 In a sense, it was this type of racist bourgeois
practice of low-tech commodity consumption that Hassoldt Davis disputed. At a moment when
leftist recruiters were reportedly gaining converts in droves, the American explorer ruled that
‘everyday technology’ should rather be deployed democratically. This supposedly would assist
in the fight against global communism, and, if need be, expand the reach of American industrial
products. More insightfully, the vision of Davis to widen the realm of the informal empire of
American consumer goods resonated with the thinking of some of the American diplomats in
French West Africa who, as part of their general effort to entrench U.S. position in the region,
were calling for an increase in U.S. presence and the market share of American products. 15 As
we shall see later, the negotiations for the opening of an American consulate in Ivory Coast in
the 1950s highlighted this point. It further underpins that Hassoldt Davis’s Ivorian trip mirrored
larger transformations in U.S. foreign policy-making in the region—subtle shifts that are best
encapsulated by the notion of the deliberate projection of American soft power.16 Before we
explore the contours of these changes any further, it might be apposite to paint a portrait of Davis
and his Ivorian expedition. Such a picture will allow us to highlight how the idiosyncrasies of
one American man could be a window to observe the American way of empire. In an age of
decolonization, indeed, the travels of Davis crystalized the workings of U.S. ‘irresistible empire,’
that is, in the words of Victoria de Grazia, ‘an informal empire, with its outright colonial
adventures aberrant, circumscribed, and generally short-lived.’17

DAVIS AND THE PEREGRINATIONS OF AN UNCONVENTIONAL COLD WARRIOR

Born in 1907 into a wealthy Boston family, Hassoldt Davis was perhaps the last
incarnation of those rich young men who endlessly suffer from pathological boredom for lack of
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outlets to expend their frustrated masculinity. In such a condition only amateur poetry and the
reading of Tarzan books provided him with an escape into an imaginary world of romance and
manhood.18 The exotic adventures of Tarzan were to have a lasting influence on the young
Davis. At 32, the Bostonian curtailed his education, leaving Harvard College to escape to Tahiti,
and later joining the Denis-Roosevelt expedition to Asia as both writer and photographer. This
experience inspired him to write Land of the Eye and Nepal, Land of Mystery, both of which
would be well received.19 At the outbreak of the Second World War, the adventure-oriented
Davis volunteered to help General Charles de Gaulle’s Free France. In order to achieve this goal,
the Bostonian now turned New Yorker boarded a steamer en route for the French Congo whence
he joined General Jacques-Philippe Leclerc and his troops in Chad as the Free French forces
readied themselves to fight the Italians in North Africa. His participation in the war won Davis
both the French Croix de Guerre and later his other services to the French government would
earn him the prestigious Légion d’Honneur.20
Even more rewarding than these mere honorific titles was the writer-explorer’s encounter
with Kouamé Adingra—a Brong prince who, after fleeing the Vichy-controlled Ivory Coast, had
joined General Leclerc’s forces in Chad. The fortuitous encounter was to facilitate Davis’s
second major expedition after the war.21 An inveterate traveler, Davis was also a prolific writer.
His stories, if sometimes contrived and voyeuristic, always had the touch of both the amateur
ethnographer and the poète manqué (unfulfilled poet). Already in 1952 he had published the
favorably received The Jungle and the Damned, an account of his expedition to French Guiana.
Acting sometimes as a literary critic himself, Davis also regularly contributed to the New York
Times.22
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It was this experienced explorer and writer who arrived in Ivory Coast in late 1949.
Accompanied by his wife Ruth—a former photographer for the French Information Service in
New York—the Francophile couple planned not only to find a village where sorcerers and
witches were supposedly trained but also to unveil the mystery surrounding the custom among
the Yakuba people of Yho (western Ivory Coast) in which a ‘king of the Dance is elected
annually and killed at the end of his term with a golden arrow.’ The Davises’ experiences in
various Ivorian outposts [Fig. 1] provided the foundation for the publication of Sorcerers’
Village, which included numerous photographs by Ruth Davis.23

FIGURE 1 SHOULD GO HERE

The least to say is that Sorcerers’ Village is replete with oxymora. The book opens with a
preface in which Hassoldt Davis extends his gratitude to the French officials who helped plan his
trip, including Governor Laurent Péchoux, the Chargeurs Reunis, the Compagnie de Transports
Océaniques, and Ambassador Henri Bonnet.24 However, the travelogue soon reveals and delves
into many instances in which the French colonists appear weak, if not effeminate cold warriors,
soon to be replaced by the stronger and more efficient Americans. Not only was the French
civilizing mission incapable of uprooting cannibalism among the so-called backward indigenous
people, but more troubling in Davis’s account was the fact the French colonial authorities proved
unable to contain the spread of communism in the territory.25 In fact, the explorer seems to fault
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the inept French for turning the alleged communists into an omnipresent threat with their
mythical leadership going ‘everywhere, but everywhere […] to make more trouble.’26
One such trouble-making instance occurred in the district of Tiébissou in the center of the
territory where the communists had reportedly rebelled against the authorities and assaulted a
number of district guards.27 While the local district commissioner (commandant de cercle)
eventually rounded up the rebellious communists and forced them to apologize and renounce
their subversive faith, agitation did not end. In fact, the communists organized a rally in the
nearby district of Toumodi soon thereafter.28 With the French displaying yet more signs of
weakness, it was only the assistance of Davis and his Lambretta scooter (symbol of European, if
American-driven, modernity) that allowed the authorities to monitor the recalcitrant
communists.29 What this episode confirmed then was that Hassoldt Davis, as a self-styled
American cold warrior, never doubted the power of machines as a more powerful tool to contain
the perceived expansion of communism. This confidence, he substantiated it with his use of
American technoscientific goods such as canned foods, radio, and voice recorder to lure the
seemingly credulous natives away from the communists and their nefarious ideology. 30 It is as if
where the French imperialists had failed to uplift the Ivorians from both material ‘backwardness’
and dearth, Davis promised—in the words of Nils Gilman—to ‘exorcise the secular demons of
the postwar world—poverty, Communism, and colonialism.’ Like the officially anointed
American modernizers, he had armed himself with ‘sacramental science and technology’ to meet
the challenge of the restive French colonial subjects of Ivory Coast.31
In truth, Sorcerers’ Village reads like a surreal story, especially for anyone familiar with
the protracted nationalist politics of postwar French West Africa. There were certainly a lot of
agitations in Ivory Coast in the late 1940s and early 1950s—a point that a body of sound
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historical works have long confirmed.32 But Davis’s fantastic narrative raises serious questions:
How, for instance, could one person (be they American or otherwise) defeat such a mighty and
well organized group as the communist militants and their sympathizers in French-ruled Ivory
Coast? How did the so-called communist agitators react to the ubiquitous presence of the
Davises in the territory? Why didn’t they attack them, especially if, as Governor Péchoux
reportedly claimed, they were ‘solely anti-whiteman’?33 It is hard to answer these questions.
And, in the absence of answers, one can legitimately cast doubt on numerous aspects of the
Davisian account, especially its allusion to the disarming power of American gadgetry on the
RDA sympathizers and their abandonment of communism. All the more so since the New York
Times, in one of its reports on the peregrinations of the Davises, highlighted economic
motivations in explaining the end of the romance between the communists and the natives in the
interior of Ivory Coast.34
The limitations of Sorcerers’ Village notwithstanding, Hassoldt Davis’s travelogue is a
privileged window that allows us to see how some Americans constructed the Cold War not only
as a struggle to win the loyalty of the ‘wretched of the earth’ (Frantz Fanon) but also as an
opportunity to replace the civilizing mission of the European powers. It was a dual effort not
only to limit the appeal of communism, but also to update and even substitute European
colonialism with a distinctively American technopolitical regime that promised material
redemption for the colonial subjects.35 But as we shall see, the story of native mobilization
against French colonialism in Ivory Coast was much more complex. For one, the Ivorians never
were the passive victims of communism and colonialism that the Davises and other American
outsiders assumed they had to liberate. Like other colonial subjects, the Ivorians tried various
approaches in their quest for emancipation and the search for the good life. A critical return to

11
the reasons why nationalist politicians and activists came to embrace communist-style agitation
in French West Africa should clarify this point. At the same time, it will let us better appreciate
the social and diplomatic contexts in which French colonial administrators, American consular
agents, and anti-colonial Ivorian activists operated.

ENACTING A COLD WAR POLITICS IN LATE COLONIAL IVORY COAST

The Ivory Coast that Hassoldt Davis visited was certainly a different place than the
territory that another American couple toured a few decades earlier when French imperialism
was at its zenith.36 The Second World War and the new international order that emerged in its
wake had both altered imperial arrangements and fired up the imaginations of those who were
calling for decolonization. It was in such context of multi-prong pressures from the colonies and
transnational activism worldwide that the postwar French authorities allowed Africans to create
trade unions and political parties. In addition to abolishing forced labor, franchise and citizenship
were also expanded. And these measures were to have shattering legacies. Now that they were
citizens of the French Union (as the French empire came to be known in 1946), Africans could
voice their opinions through organized labor, newspaper publishing, or rallies and even send
representatives to the French national assembly.37 To take full advantage of this new
conjuncture, political training for African leaders and activists emerged as an urgent task. In
cities and provincial towns, the educated elite attended informal course sessions and/or
workshops on political ideas and the practical ways of organizing the masses—extramural
educational activities to which metropolitan leftist civil servants on post in the region contributed
enormously. It was from these training sessions that the members of the interterritorial political
movement, the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), adopted their Marxist-inspired
tactics that helped them better mobilize the masses and out-compete other political organizations.
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And when the time came for RDA’s elected parliamentarians to strike an alliance with
metropolitan political parties at the Bourbon Palace (French National Assembly), they naturally
gravitated toward the French Communist Party (PCF).38
Historians of French West Africa have long scrutinized the nature of the ideological
orientation of the RDA, especially in the context of the anti-colonial agitations of the mid-1940s
and 1950s. Most of these scholars agree that the organization was primarily agitating for
decolonization—even though the very meaning of decolonization remained contested among
various members of the movement.39 French officials thought otherwise. Although ultimately
never proven, notes historian Alexander Keese, they ‘were convinced that many Africans
organized in the RDA were manipulated by the French Communist Party and controlled from
Paris.’ In their beliefs, some of those officials went as far as to hold that ‘the African party
leaders were under strict orders “from Moscow,” transmitted via the French capital.’ 40 In reality,
it was practical considerations that had led the RDA to strike an alliance with the PCF. As Tony
Chafer has shown in his history of decolonization in French West Africa, when the RDA
parliamentarians were elected to the French National Assembly, they ‘were not sufficiently
numerous to form a separate parliamentary group. In need of an alliance in order to maximize
their effectiveness, they decided to affiliate to the Communist Party.’ In an imperial context
dominated by paranoia over the war in Vietnam, authorities might have concluded that RDA was
up to a communist revolution. But as Chafer emphasizes, the leaders of RDA ‘were not
communists and [their] decision did not reflect [any] ideological position.’41
It is doubtful that the American diplomats and intelligence services dealing with Frenchruled Africa were not aware of these specific developments. They had kept track on the activities
of various nationalist movements in French West Africa. This was especially the case with
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RDA’s Ivorian branch—the Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), which had been quite
active between 1946 and 1950 and thus had garnered a lot of attention in the media.42 In early
1948, for instance, a consular report from Dakar accused Ivory Coast’s leading political party of
fomenting discontent among the population. As a consequence, the dispatch continued,
‘economic conditions […] have noticeably deteriorated.’43 A year later, a report of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) revealed that although there was a similarity of view between RDA
and communism, the African political organization could not be said to be subservient to
Moscow. All RDA wanted was ‘full equality and social improvement for the Africans.’44 Despite
this attempt at distinguishing between the citizenship yearnings of the Africans and their
embrace of communism, another CIA internal document observed in March 1950 that Ivory
Coast was the main focus of ‘organized Communist activity’ in French West Africa.45
At best, the reports of the intelligence services were thus contradictory. In Washington,
however, some of the more influential members of the U.S. foreign policy elite were tactfully
appropriating the CIA’s latest line of interpretation of events in French West Africa to further
their own agenda. Their first impulse was to request appropriations from the U.S. Congress in a
view toward opening new legations in Africa, including a consular post in the Ivorian capital.
This was cannily proposed in 1951.46 In justifying such request, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Burton Y. Berry stated before a commission of the Congress that his Department’s information
was that a ‘Communist-front party has its stronghold in Abidjan. From there it infiltrates
members through Black Africa, going even to Leopoldville.’47 Elaborating on this point, the
diplomat further explained: ‘On the belief that infiltration does exist and is a potential danger, we
would like to know a great deal more about it than we do, and a great deal more than we can
know from our present listening posts.’48
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The discussions between Berry and the House Appropriations Committee might have
remained buried in the Congressional records had it not been for a front page coverage in Le
Monde, which provoked the French decision-makers into action—an entanglement that confirms
that, in the Cold War context (and probably beyond it), the media and other non-state actors
remained significant protagonists in the complex relationships between the United States,
France, and its empire. Relaying the request of the State Department to their audience, the
French newspaper reported that the United States was considering opening a Consulate General
in Abidjan so as to “monitor” the subversive activities of communists. Amplifying the terms of
Berry’s congressional appearance, Le Monde pointed out that communist organizers were
allegedly using Ivory Coast as a base to destabilize the entire West African region.49
More discomfited than alarmed by the journalistic revelation, French colonial authorities
in West Africa undertook their own investigation. They concluded, however, that the United
States ultimately had ‘commercial motives’ in calling for the opening of a consular post in
Abidjan. Thus, when the American request eventually arrived at the Quai d’Orsay in the spring
of 1951, it was promptly denied.50 Notwithstanding the vogue of American bashing in France in
the 1950s, the justification that the officials in Paris put forward to reject the proposed opening
of a U.S. legation in Ivory Coast should not be brushed aside lightly, especially given the timing
of the American request, which occurred AFTER both the disaffiliation of the RDA with the
French communists and the inauguration of the deep-sea port of Abidjan, the completion of
which had been aided by U.S. tax money.51
Although RDA’s Ivorian branch still exerted a tremendous appeal among the population,
the crackdown that Governor Laurent Péchoux began when he took office in 1948 was starting to
bear some encouraging results. Besides the all too familiar tactic of intimidating PDCI
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sympathizers, péchoutage (as the governor’s harsh method was later dubbed) used the event of
urban riots in 1949 to ‘adopt strict measures’ against the leadership of the party, going as far as
to imprison many of its field secretaries.52 Such unchecked frontal attack on PDCI members
caused some cracks within RDA ranks. This was all the more possible since the PCF, which was
a key member in the postwar coalition government in France, had parted ways with its
metropolitan governing allies, leaving its African partner vulnerable to intimidation. Ultimately,
as a CIA assessment revealed, the Péchoux measures proved consequential, since not only did
they lead to PDCI membership to decline, but more dramatically RDA’s president, Félix
Houphouët-Boigny, disaffiliated in May 1950 his organization from the French Communist
Party.53
Admittedly, péchoutage did not annihilate RDA’s Ivorian branch entirely. But, in the
eyes of the American diplomats in Dakar, the governor’s ‘handling of the communistic uprising
in the Ivory Coast’ was said to have ‘probably destroyed considerable of the strength of this
communistic movement in that country.’54 Indeed, unlike in the neighboring Guinea where the
intimidation of the colonial state reinforced the control of the left-wing of the party in the long
run, Péchoux and his methods in Ivory Coast paved the way for the realignment of PDCI’s
actions and tactics. This new deal ushered in a period of productive, if ambiguous, collaboration
with the colonial administration.55
In light of this development, American foreign policy bureaucrats might have
exaggerated the communist threat when they requested to open a legation in Ivory Coast. What
was at stake appears to have been the expansion of the consular service network in an effort to
attend to the increased importance of Ivory Coast for American businesses. This is supported by
an American consular note intended for the State Department that argued in early August 1950
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that ‘It would be highly useful if we could announce the opening of a Consulate at Abidjan in
connection with the new importance which that port will have when the [Vridi] canal has been
fully opened to ocean-going traffic.’56 Despite this fact, it bears emphasizing that the very use of
the specter of communist subversion as a bogeyman to prompt Congress into action reflected a
real, if at times misguided, concern among American policymaking elite—a point that historians
have highlighted in other contexts.57
As a perceptive correspondent of the Manchester Guardian noted at the time, the plan to
open a listening post in Abidjan had other implications. In a rather subtle way, it inadvertently
pointed out that some American diplomats increasingly doubted the capacity or the will of the
French authorities to effectively deal with communism.58 In the metropole itself, such doubts on
the ability of the French to curb communist agitations had led the U.S. agents to break the most
elementary elements of diplomatic decorum.59 As we have shown, the activities of Hassoldt
Davis in Ivory Coast brought to light similar issues regarding the global Cold War. There is,
however, more to the Davis story that needs further elaboration. Indeed, if anything, the actions
of the Davises in Ivorian territory suggested that some Americans readily believed in the
expansion of a consumerist ethics as the surest antidote to the growth of Soviet influence in the
postwar world. Scholars have persuasively demonstrated this in the case of metropolitan France.
The travels of the Davises allow us to see how this played out in a colonial context.60

PROMOTING AN AMERICAN CONSUMER ETHICS IN POSTWAR IVORY COAST?

As one critical reviewer of the movie version of the opus put it, there is little doubt that
the value of Hassoldt Davis’s ethnographic work on Ivory Coast is overwhelmingly disputable.
A similar assessment could validly be made about the book that came out of the expedition. Yet
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while the ethnography in Sorcerers’ Village was ‘more diverting than memorable,’ the
significance of the book lay beyond the rather modest artistic qualities of Davis’s travelogue.61
This is so because travel writing, taken as a literary and cinematic genre, is as much about
accumulating knowledge as it is about extending the disciplinary gaze of the empire. 62 In this
light, Hassoldt Davis may well have been a poor ethnographer, but he must be held as an agent
par excellence of the U.S. imperial drive in postwar Ivory Coast, an operative not unlike the
official American consular staffs. A careful re-reading of the narrative of Davis’s travel
throughout the West African country underscores this clearly since it reveals the Davises to be in
the vanguard of extending the reach of America’s capitalist and consumer modernity in French
West Africa. And this was largely to the detriment of French colonial interests.
A quick reading of Sorcerers’ Village might lead one to summarily conclude that Davis
was yet another American sympathetic subscriber to French colonialism, especially since the
explorer’s first informant was none other than the local representative of the Institut Français
d’Afrique Noire (IFAN)—a research organization that acted as one of the key players in the
construction, circulation, and institutionalization of French Africanist discourse during the
colonial era.63 However, Davis’s visit to IFAN’s local office in Abidjan might best be seen as a
means of strategically tapping information to design the contour of his planned trip. Thus, as the
expedition party set off for the interior of Ivory Coast and gradually moved away from the
French-style city of Abidjan, it soon appeared that besides the logistical aid of the French
colonial authorities, the major forces that would help Davis in completing his exploration were
American small-scale machines and consumer products such as flashlights, Coleman lanterns,
radio sets, canned foods, and the like. He would use American consumer goods not only to
nourish his body, but also deployed them to shield himself from attack. For instance, he
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reportedly used his hotshot (a device also known as cattle prod that carries current at its “shock
end”) to subdue unruly native peoples whenever he felt threatened by their presence. ‘My
electric bull-prod [was] charged with three common flashlight batteries and shaped liked a thick
cane,’ the American reminisced in his travelogue. It ‘was the greatest defensive tool for close-up
work I ever used. It emitted a shock that made bulls go happily to the butcher’s kindlier mallet,
and made drunken natives sober up so cold they could freeze you at a glance.’64
Insightful in showcasing the literal and/or metaphorical power of low-tech gadgets, Davis
stressed that he repeatedly mobilized American technoculture to keep recalcitrant agitators in
check. He also used gadgets to lure the native populations who had apparently remained
impervious to the French mission civilisatrice. In one instance, where a ‘communist’ agitator—
presumably an RDA activist—was to speak during a rally in South Central Ivory Coast, Davis
plotted with his wife to derail the plan. His elaboration is worth quoting at length because it
indexes the clout that the American traveler assigned to low-tech machines: ‘All right, baby.
We’re going to cause a distraction. We are going to ride round and round the market place on the
scooters.’ Although Davis believed that ‘these gentlemen don’t prefer blondes,’ he sensed that
‘they will be fascinated by our funny scooters and pay more attention to us.’65 As anticipated, the
spectacle of the scooter was ‘not to be ignored.’ In fact, as soon as the Davises began to
implement their plan, ‘Heads turned toward us and our ludicrous but fantastically potent
machines. Children followed us. We stopped to give lifts to some of them, and that brought
cheers from the crowd, whose backs were to the agitator.’66
In another episode, villagers in the sorcerer’s heartland were made to witness the power
of American gadgetry. After days during which the Davises had been shunned by the local
population, the ingenuity of U.S. technoscience won the natives over: ‘I believe it was the
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Hotcan which brought them to us first,’ Davis wrote. Noting emphatically, he added: ‘The
Hotcan is a most remarkable American product. You can buy it with various foods, solid or
liquid, in it, and it is self-heating. It is a double can, really, with food in the center.’67 To
underscore the low-tech and mundane nature of the product’s working principle, Davis offered:
‘You make a hole in it, invert it, and within ten minutes when the water of one compartment has
mixed with the magic chemicals, it becomes boiling hot and steam gushes forth without recourse
to any exterior flame. Then you open it with a simple can-opener and eat a delectable hot
meal.’68
The Davises had used the canned food ‘for quick lunches in the truck, without stopping.’
For the villagers, however, ‘it was tinned magic,’ which the American quickly mobilized to his
advantage: ‘When the chief and the chief sorcerer, having heard of it through their spies, came to
call, I punctured a couple of tins of beef stew for them and passed them the cans to hold.’ As
expected, the cans ‘heated within ten seconds, they were burning off their paper labels in fifteen,
and were dropped to the ground as the chief and the chief sorcerer hopped about, waving their
burning hands, and fortunately, laughing at this miracle.’69
It was inventions such as this and many others that allegedly helped Davis convince the
restive villagers of Ivory Coast to follow the American lead. One does not have to believe in all
the rather tall tales that the traveler reported. But from the standpoint of archival research, it is
clear that many contemporary Americans did trust the power of the low-tech gadgets in a world
at large. In fact, anticipating the marketing possibilities that an African expedition might offer for
their global expansion, American firms had contributed to the funding of Davis’s voyage to
French West Africa.70 For instance, in response to the explorer’s request for donation—which it
granted, the Borden Company demanded in return that Davis provided negatives to be displayed
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in ads: ‘We, of course, look forward to receiving pictures of Borden products in use—primarily
by the natives.’71
In fact, there was a symbiotic relationship between the expedition and the American
companies—with the firms deciding to underwrite part of the travels while entrusting the
expedition party with the task of marketing their brands. There is little doubt that the businesses
found in Davis a cheaper alternative source of publicity for their products in faraway places. This
is best shown in a correspondence between the Bridgeport Brass Company and Davis: ‘We
appreciate your taking our products on your expedition and will be looking forward to reports
from you from time to time about their effectiveness in the tropics.’72 This line of thinking was
shared by the Lederle Laboratories Division, a company involved in the manufacture of medical
products. In supplying the Davis Expedition with drugs and health products, the firm requested
that ‘if you have any pictures which show some spectacular chieftain or colorful local belle, give
me the story on it and we might get it into the press.’ The only requirement that Lederle Labs had
was that ‘inasmuch as we must always be very accurate in the medical information that we send
out, and also very ethical, a doctor be present in any picture showing the actual administration of
a drug, whenever possible.’73
These correspondences and other exchanges show that Davis was operating on behalf of
some important U.S. business interests, including Bell & Howell Company, Sawyer’s inc.,
Polaroid Corporation, the Tupper Corporation, and the Quaker Oats Company. 74 An inveterate
explorer and a critic of the American materialistic ethos, Davis was nonetheless the
representative of a culture that created in him only revulsion. In this role as a salesperson of
corporate America [Fig. 2], both at home and abroad, he served the interests of those big
companies (cf. Borden, Eastman, Tupper) that were doggedly in search of new lands to bring
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into the fold of the American Century. Anthropologist Alison J. Clarke has demonstrated a
similar point convincingly in her discussion of the 1950s promotional campaigns of Tupperware
artifacts in which Hassoldt Davis was the focal attraction. In 1954, indeed, Davis was contracted
to appear in the pages of Tupperware Sparks—the in-house magazine of the Tupperware
company. There he ‘enacted in a bizarre scene of commodity imperialism [that] far exceeded
Earl Tupper’s modest vision of the total “Tupperization” of North American homes, by
introducing Tupperware to an African nomadic tribe.’ In terms of design, the ad substituted the
‘traditional ritual palm-sapping and blood letting vessels’ of the African natives ‘with EconoCanisters and Wonder Bowls, Tupperware [which Davis] boasted, “had been through the
roughest treatment the natives could subject it to,” including the use [of one] canister as a
container for “magic” witch-craft powder.’75

FIGURE 2 SHOULD GO HERE

We definitely do not know how many American products the Davis Expedition brought
to Ivory Coast. But as the exploration party crisscrossed the territory from South to North and
East to West, the Davises always made sure that they left behind a ‘heap of grateful presents’ for
the native peoples.76 The complexity of the ‘social life’ that consumer products may assume in a
society does not allow gauging the reception of Davis’s ‘grateful presents’ among the local
people, especially so since we understand, following the insight of Igor Kopytoff, that ‘the same
thing may, at the same time, be seen as a commodity by one person and as something else by
another.’77 In fact, as in so many instances of cultural contacts, the consumer products ‘can show
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what anthropologists have so often stressed: that what is significant about the adoption of alien
objects—as of alien ideas—is not the fact that they are adopted, but the way they are culturally
redefined and put to use.’78
These complexities of the cultural biographies of things put aside, if one should rely on
Davis’s own account, it seems that the local populations not only liked the gifts left by the
Americans but also actively sought them.79 Thus as he opened the Ivorian territory to the
‘imperial eyes’ of the United States, Hassoldt Davis was also subtly paving the way for the
projection of American soft power and the market-driven consumer culture that it diligently
conveyed. In this vein, his work hardly differed from the one carried out by earlier American
internationalists and global travelers in their efforts to spread the American dream. 80
Archival materials bear witness to this argument. Even before Davis’s expedition to Ivory
Coast, American firms had been trying to tap the various markets of France’s African colonies.
In a report written toward the end of the Second World War, for instance, French colonial
authorities observed that American businesses were ‘considering the exploitation of the
commercial markets located in our possessions of West and Equatorial Africa.’81 This was
happening within the context of increased commercial relations between U.S. traders and French
West Africa. Indeed, Ivorian cocoa beans had found their way to Great Britain and the United
States throughout the war years.82 As the conflict came to a close, tropical wood from France’s
African colonies (Ivory Coast and Gabon in particular) came to supplement the now diverse
agricultural products that supplied the American market.83
While contemporary accounts specifically emphasized American interest in the
exploitation of rubber, peanuts, and other agricultural raw materials, it was also the case that
many American businesses were developing an interest in the booming infrastructural markets

23
that French West Africa offered. Already in 1941, RCA Communications had opened a
radiotelegraph circuit that was to link the United States to various cities in French Africa.84
Illustrating a similar U.S. interest, if obliquely, was an unsuccessful bid on behalf of the
American constructor Raymond Concrete Pile in 1946 to finish the construction of the Abidjan
port facilities. However, given French fears of American encroachment, the offer did not go
through.85
Such setback did not deter the proponents of the expansion of U.S. market share in the
territory. With the completion of the port of Abidjan in 1951, American trading activities with
the territory became aggressive and quite dynamic—a situation that the Export and Import
Bureau of the Baltimore Association of Commerce had projected, prompting the entrepreneurial
trade group to inaugurate a regular shipping route to Ivory Coast. 86 While the Ivorian market
progressively closed to the importation of American cigarette and tobacco, there was an increase
in the demand of other U.S. merchandises, including dairy products, chemicals, metallic wares,
and other technoscientic commodities such as frames, grinders/crushers, spare parts, and
insecticides.87
Even more important for the project of expanding the reach of the American informal
empire in Ivory Coast was the increasing Ivorian share in the overall U.S. export to French West
Africa. From a share of 17 percent in 1947, the Ivorian market came to absorb more than 40
percent of American exports to the region by the middle of the 1950s. This was a remarkable
development in U.S.-West African commercial relations, especially since Ivory Coast remained
demographically among the smaller markets of France’s empire in West Africa. But what the
territory lacked in population, it easily compensated it with the relatively higher purchasing
power of its residents, including the ever increasing metropolitan urban elite and the African
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planter class who now enjoyed improved purchasing powers thanks to the rising prices of coffee
and cocoa.88
Evidently, in proposing the request to open an American consulate in Abidjan in the
summer of 1950, Consul General Perry N. Jester had these developments in mind. Writing to the
State Department, he had noted that the Ivorian capital was ‘emerging as the great commercial
city and as the great center of activity of all kinds on the Gulf of Guinea.’ Given this reality,
American economic interests had to be represented, especially since the opening of the Vridi
Canal was expected to ‘cause a drastic reorientation of shipping, transportation, and
communication in French West Africa.’89 Anticipating such reorientation, and regardless of the
diplomatic setback they had met at the beginning of the decade, U.S. diplomats continued to
press for the opening of a consulate in Ivory Coast. In 1955, Washington reiterated its request to
the French authorities. Although Paris acquiesced this time, a lack of adequate funding prevented
the Department of State from setting up its second legation in French West Africa. A new
request was introduced the following year in the midst of a new bout of American paranoia over
communist activities in Africa.90 It was this request of 1956 that resulted in the opening of the
American consulate in Abidjan and the appointment of Parke Duncan Massey as its first officer
in 1957. Thus, by the time of Ivorian independence was proclaimed in 1960, not only had Ivory
Coast become safe for capitalism, but it seemed that the country had been brought successfully
into the fold to the Pax Americana.91

CONCLUSION

It would be an understatement to claim that the emerging scholarship on U.S.
involvement in postwar African affairs has the potential to retool the larger historiography of
American foreign relations in the twentieth century. With its focus on America’s relations with
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late colonial Ivory Coast, this article has aimed to contribute to this agenda. In particular, it has
highlighted the fractal character of policy-making in a world dominated by Cold War activism,
anticolonial nationalism, and the American Century. I have argued that in the liminal world of
decolonization, the globalization of the American capitalist modernity operated as a subtle
critique of the civilizing missions of the European colonial powers. Indeed, as the saga
surrounding the U.S. request to open a consulate in Abidjan demonstrated, there was more than a
drive to checkmate the Soviets in the emerging Third World. Rhetorically, American diplomats
may have used the language of the Cold War and the threat of Soviet infiltration to sell their
policies, but their actions bespoke of the old vision of a market-driven informal imperialism and
the projection of American soft power. This would become even clearer in the late 1950s and
1960s as a number of U.S. companies challenged and sometimes outbid French firms in the
competition for development expertise in Ivory Coast.92 As historian Martin Thomas has
suggested then, it was not simply the diplomats in Washington who single-handedly decided on
the posture to adopt vis-à-vis a post-1945 world that was shedding off the yoke of traditional
space-based imperialism. Instead, there were other constituencies, including ‘the US consular
service […] and the network of American business interests,’ both of which labored tirelessly in
an effort to establish an American informal empire in Africa.93
A critical analysis of the work of Hassoldt Davis along with a close scrutiny of his
interactions with the people of Ivory Coast lends support to the point that the American way of
empire was relatively novel since it indeed ‘inaugurated the system of annexing wealth, apart
from inhabitants or territories, disdaining outward shows in order to arrive at the essentials of
domination without a dead-weight of areas to administer and multitudes to govern.’94 Of course,
Davis did not stay long enough to see how, in the context of the Cold War, the United States
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effectively, if unevenly, reached these “essentials of domination” in Ivory Coast without a
physical presence of its army or even the appointment of a permanent diplomatic corps. In fact,
by the time the first American consul arrived in Abidjan in 1957, the explorer had returned to the
United States. Back home, his whims became ever more eccentric. Increasingly alcoholic, he
ended up forcing Ruth to seek divorce; which she did in the closing years of the decade and went
back to Africa, where she opened an art gallery. Lonely, Davis only found solace in hard liquor,
‘now drinking more or less all the time,’ as Millman reveals in his introduction to a new edition
of Davis’s The Jungle & the Damned. In 1959, this descent into alcoholism sent the unusual
American cold warrior to his grave.95
Despite its rather cheerless ending, the story of Hassoldt Davis, like those of many other
American liberals in the Third World, provides a window to appreciate in close-up the drama of
U.S. Cold War activism and its entanglement with deliberate attempts to expand the realm of
consumer capitalism. In fact, it magnifies the way(s) in which the mobilization of ‘everyday
technology’ contributed to U.S. imperial outreach. In the era of Sputnik and nuclear arm race, to
be sure, the United States deployed highly sophisticated technologies to wage the battle against
its Soviet rival, especially during the proxy wars of the global Cold War. But those instances
may actually have been the proverbial exceptions that confirmed the rule of American presence
in the world. At a time when Soviet technological breakthroughs were demonstrating that
Marxist-Leninism could equally lead to high-modernity, it was the low-tech machines and
gadgets that seemingly convinced those ‘wretched of the earth’ inhabiting on the margins of the
Cold War’s hot spots that American know-how was ‘mightier than Marx.’ This makes Davis’s
odyssey in late colonial Ivory Coast all the more remarkable because it reveals that American
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technological artifacts, especially in the form of small-scale machines, were seen as a powerful
way to exhibit and project American power.
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